113, 648, 721, 175, 563 Southeast Asia AL1

[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1 , Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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POSTSCRIPT

AN article in *Ta Kung Pao*, the Shanghai newspaper, of 28 January 1950 was taken as adumbrating the future policy of the People's Government towards Chinese overseas and the governments of Southeast Asia. It began by saying:

> Now that the People's Republic of China has been established and diplomatic relations have been opened between the Central People's Government and a number of other countries, the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further abuse.

The article pointed out that it was clearly stipulated in Article 58 of the Common Programme that 'the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall do its utmost to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad'. In pursuance of this principle, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lodged strong protests with the French and Thai authorities against the abuse of Chinese nationals. The article was particularly concerned to attack the Thai and French governments. 'The Fascist elements in Thailand [it said] have a long record of outrageous action in the persecution of Chinese nationals, and for years Thailand has been a veritable hell to the overseas Chinese there.' Malaya received only incidental mention. 'But [the article continued] going back a little, we find that countless numbers of Chinese have been murdered in the Dutch East Indies during the past few years. All in all, the annals of the struggles of the overseas Chinese may be considered to be written in blood. It must be evident that it is impossible for overseas Chinese to live in peace under imperialistic rule. . . . We know full well that the indiscriminate bombing of Shanghai together with the persecution of Chinese nationals in Thailand, Indochina, and Malaya, are all part of an imperialist plot for both direct and indirect attack against the Chinese people.'

Peking radio thereafter systematically attacked the Southeast Asian governments for their alleged ill treatment of the overseas Chinese. In the case of Malaya it was noticeable that direct mention of the terrorist campaign was avoided in the ensuing months.

The diplomatic position in August 1950 was that Burma and Indonesia had recognized the People's Government of China and representatives were being exchanged, Britain had also recognized the People's Government but negotiations for the terms on which representatives would be exchanged were still in dilatory progress, while France, Thailand, and the Philippines still recognized the Nationalist Government which was then taking refuge in Formosa.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
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A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

7: Furnivall
642, 647, 648, 471

Southeast Asia ALl

[For a theoretical discussion of the necessity for granting political autonomy to the colonial dependencies of western states and the required changes in administrative practices and economic policy, see cat. 116, pp. 468-512; for discussion of the relationship between the colonies and the colonial powers in the modern world, and the author's proposal for international collaboration in preparing the colonies for eventual independence, see pp. 513-550.]

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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Some advocate Dominion status as an alternative.[1] But, for countries such as Burma, Dominion status is an unmeaning formula. The British Dominions are countries potentially able to stand alone but preferring to be associated on equal terms with the other major partners in the Commonwealth. Burma is not in that position. The racial divisions and sharp conflict of interest and sentiment, which weakened the former Government, would still continue and are incompatible with Dominion status. On the other hand, if the Burman leaders had accepted it, they would have split their party, strengthened their rivals, especially the so-called Communists, and conferred on the prevalent dacoity the halo of patriotism and the semblance of civil war. It is lamentable that we failed to capture the imagination of the people so as to inspire an instinctive loyalty to the British connection, but we cannot escape the consequences of the past. In purporting to grant Dominion status, we would have been promising something that we could not give in return for support that the leaders of the people were unable to command. Once again we would have been committed to the ungrateful task of pacification; more difficult now, and far more costly, than after the wars of 1852 and 1885 when we could employ Indian troops.

I hold then that on both parts the decision in favour of independence was as wise as it was bold, not only in their interest but in ours. Nothing less than independence could transform nationalism from a destructive fever into a creative force. Yet national independence is not a cause or guarantee of welfare. Burmans still need help, and by our long connection we can do most to give the help they need. But we can help them only on terms acceptable to both parties. If we can help Burmans to stand alone securely, we may perhaps look forward to a time when they will welcome a more intimate association. However that may be, we can at least feel that we have done our best to meet whatever difficulties lie ahead by responding boldly to the challenge of a new age.

J. S. FURNIVALL

24 October 1947

[1] [i.e. to unqualified independence—Analyst.]

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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Southeast Asia and World History

• 648 175 At the present time the whole of Southeast Asia is obviously and dangerously entangled in world history. Often it is suggested that this is quite a new thing. Actually, there is nothing new in the entanglement of Southeast Asia in world history. After pointing out that the Southeast Asian states derived their civilization from India but fell within the political orbit of China, Professor Coedes summarizes the consequences:

> Most of these states have reacted to the great shocks that have disturbed the Indian peninsular and the Middle Kingdom. The conquests of Samudragupta in the Ganges Valley and South India in the 4th century and the expansionist policy of Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 11th century have had their repercussions on the other side of the Bay of Bengal. Even more markedly has the history of Further India been influenced by affairs in China. The Chinese have never looked favorably on the growth of strong powers in the southern seas, and it deserves notice that Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran realms reached the zenith of their prosperity during just those epochs when the great dynasties of China were enfeebled. Also these countries are mutually linked together by numerous ties, geographic and economic, and every revolution in any one of them, by disturbing the whole region, has had repercussions on the others.[5]

Similarly, Krom suggests links between the course of events in India and the spread of Indian settlements over Southeast Asia.[6]

648 439 In a talk on the Tropical Far East and world history at the Siam Society, Bangkok, Furnivall pointed to economic

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5. J. S. Furnivall, "The Tropical Far East and World History," Journal of the Siam Society, Volume 39, Part 2 (January 1952), pp. 120-21.

6. Ibid., p. 121.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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• 648 439 geography for an explanation of the relations between Southeast Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

175 439 487 648 For China there have always been two main lines of communication with the West: the land route across central Asia, and the sea route round the coast. Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of Southeast Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.

For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

175 439 648 The search for gold following Vespasian's placing of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.

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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

175 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of
439 Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts
• 648 and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the
177 old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The
563 settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people,
648 acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers
177 with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison,
648 for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11] It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500, Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

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175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
• 648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
563 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

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648 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of communication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

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• 648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural resources of the whole region.

This change-over from a subsistence economy to a commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops. It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, upsetting the balance of a medieval world. The free, individualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate strength of family and village. But the most serious direct threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's ownership of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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184 distribution, and aspects of Western colonial policy which have tended to increase the contrasts between parts of the region, there are certain considerations of broader nature and of far-reaching significance that give validity to the concept of Southeast Asia as a regional unit possessing certain common features which will be discussed in brief as follows:

a. Common heritage of colonialism.
b. Dual economy.
c. Plural society.
d. Dominance of the agricultural section.
e. High rate of population growth.
f. Determination to industrialize.
g. Small size of market and slow rate of capital formation.

433 The direction as well as the pace of economic develop-
• 648 ment in the colonial or protected areas of Southeast Asia has been primarily determined by the overriding economic interests of the imperial powers. Even in Thailand, where political independence was preserved, economic dependence upon European capital resulted in the creation of a characteristically 'colonial' economy. This is exemplified by the following conditions: (1) producer of raw materials; (2) concentration on a few export products; and (3) lack of manufacturing industries. As a consequence, these countries are highly affected by substitution, price fluctuations, and changes in consumer demand. Furthermore, they are dependent on limited markets for export, and hence are adversely

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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433 affected by these few importing countries' determination
• 648 to be self-sufficient in food.

181 A dual economy as a distinctive character of colonial
433 rule is a theory propounded by some Dutch economists who contend that in tropical dependencies there are two distinct systems of economy. In the Western sector economic forces act in strict accordance with the economic laws enunciated by the earlier classical economists; but in the Eastern sector these laws have no force, and Western economic principles are inapplicable. The Western sector is ultra-capitalist since economic forces act freely, not even subject to the social inhibitions which still restrain them in Europe or the Western world; the Eastern sector, on the other hand, is precapitalist, with prestige carrying more weight than profit and communal influence restraining the individual desire of gain.[17] One
433 of the consequences of a dual economy is that it is difficult
438 to conduct business because the people will not trade on
439 Western lines. Inefficiency in trade leads to high operational cost and thus to social waste. Moreover, there is a likelihood of exploitation of indigenous people by Western traders as well as by foreigners of Asian origin who are free from social restraint.
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563 One feature that has long been common to the countries of Southeast Asia and is so obvious that it could not fail

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17. J. S. Furnivall, "Cooperation, Competition, and Isolation," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot, op. cit., p. 71.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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development who fear that these countries might not be able to expand their production faster than population expands, in which case the result of economic development efforts will be a greater quantity of people with little or no gains in the quality of living conditions. In Zinkin's words, "The growth of population and the impact of the West have between them, in the last hundred years, so upset the delicate balance that most of the Asian countryside is now bankrupt . . . . The alarming feature of the peasant economy of Asia is not simply that it is desparately poor. It is that in recent decades, and in most countries of Asia, it has been growing poorer. It is a changing, dynamic economy. But it has been changing for the worse."[23]

Poverty is not new in Southeast Asia. What is new is the awareness of poverty and the conviction that something can be done about it. "A great change", reported Harold Butler, "is stirring Eastern society. The consciousness of misery has been created by the growing realization that it is not the inescapable lot of the poor and that chances of better life now exist."[24] All of the countries in Southeast Asia have within the past decade set up official agencies charged with planning and promoting economic development; and for international assistance to hasten it, is the constant

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23. Zinkin, op. cit., p. 34.

24. Harold Butler, Problems of Industry in the East (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1938, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 29), pp. 65-66.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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theme of their spokesmen in the economic and social organs of the United Nations. It is probably too early at this moment to speculate on the outcome of Southeast Asia's determination to industrialize. Much can be said, however, about the element of urgency and speediness commonly attached to each project of industrial development envisaged by each of these countries. "For successful development," cautions Staley, "two things are necessary: a substantial and continued economic advance -- and a social and political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, stable and responsive democratic government, and cooperation with other free societies."[25] The same writer warns that if capital investment and material technology are puched energetically in an underdeveloped country while little or no attention is given to deliberate promotion of appropriate social and psychological change, the result is likely to be either a failure of the development process to "take" and become "self-generating" or creation of a menace to the free world.[26] Garner also gives similar warning, "People have to develop themselves before they can change their physical environment, and this is a slow process."[27]

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A most important factor that has kept Southeast Asia economically underdeveloped is the small size of market in

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25. Staley, op. cit., p. 202.

26. Ibid., p. 203.

27. Ibid., p. 203.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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43 each of the countries in the area, which is due to the low
44 level of their real income. This small size of market has important effects on the volume of international trade, on the pattern of foreign investment, and on the use of domestic savings.

• 648 Because of their low level of productivity and
43 hence of low real purchasing power, the underdeveloped
44 agricultural countries play a minor part in world trade.
47 Business investment abroad has tended in the past to shy away from industries working for the domestic market in the underdeveloped areas and to concentrate instead on primary production for export to the advanced industrial centers. With special reference to Southeast Asia, most writers assign the pattern to the commercial design of the colonial powers. Nurkse, however, maintains that it does not reflect any sinister conspiracy or deliberate policy, still less a concerted attempt of the rich countries to exploit the poor. "Exploitation there may have been," he said, "but this pattern of foreign investment by itself does not constitute any proof of it. This pattern can be readily accounted for on obvious economic grounds. The explanation lies, on the one hand, in the poverty of the local consumers in the underdeveloped countries, and on the other, in the large and, in the nineteenth century, vigorously expanding markets for primary products in the world's industrial centers."[28]

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28. Ragner Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: A. T. Broome and Son, 1953), p. 25.

9; Christian F, H-3 (no date) 1941 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell, London, 1929, p. 62.

9: Christian F, H-3 (no date) 1941 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères. 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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FIG. 1

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories, n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah," 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia. *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855. London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9]

Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong.

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73. Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . ; 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Veikel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . . the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advantages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

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[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysê, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches. C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891. pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 90–109.

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Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace, Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 265–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a lease at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £20,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 187.

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177 part of Southeast Asia for even short periods, new forces may fill it, while avoiding the responsibilities of government provided by the colonial system. The new or re-established nations cannot avoid contact with the old and the new forces. The tools, the experience and perhaps the doctrines they need are to be found abroad, for the vast increase in their peoples has added to the problem of poverty so that it can only be solved by the increasing use of perfected forms of production in agriculture and in industry.

177 The independence of the Philippine Republic, the preparations for independence in Indonesia, the recognition of Viet Nam, the constitutional
648 progress of Burma, thus not only mark a local epoch; they are of world-wide significance. In many cases, they represent a change of national policies. Internationally, in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, countries responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have undertaken "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions." Events in Southeast Asia and the course of discussions at the General Assembly of the United Nations suggest that the general principles of Chapter XI cannot be relegated to the future as pious aspirations. For good or for insufficient reasons, the pattern of past colonial rule has been broken, and the trend of world policy presupposes the relaxation of the political controls established by the Western powers in Southeast Asia and the rapid emergence of new sovereign states.

Even so, the basic problem of Southeast Asia in relation to world affairs is not the passing of the colonial stage of government. It is the broader problem of the evolution towards self-reliance of communities which in the past were largely controlled by outside forces in their economic and social, as well as in their political life, and which at present must seek some adjustment with these and other world forces. The political aspects of the problem are narrowing. They mainly relate to the detailed questions of when, where and how political autonomy will be established. On the other hand, Southeast Asia may long remain under foreign domination in matters of economic and social policy, with the danger that indirect control will be established without responsibility and that the next center of world rivalries will be found in the region.

The countries of Southeast Asia will be unable to play their part in the peace and prosperity of the world without drastic improvements in the economic and social life of their peoples. Poverty, unbalanced economic development, ill health, ignorance, labor difficulties and the exploitation of the weak by the strong, which were problems during the period of European control, will not be abolished by the abolition of such control. The change is that the countries will need economic and social assistance which can aid their political evolution.

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of unions in industries the operation of which did not directly affect the public order.

The employers' resistance to unionization derived naturally from their desire to have available an abundant supply of cheap labor. They had on their side, as an argument that must weigh heavily with the governments, the involvement which such organizations as existed were believed to have with subversive political parties and leaders. Communism was reported to be rife among the Chinese labor groups. Indian Congress emissaries were supposed to be stirring up the traditionally docile Indian coolies. The growing wave of strikes and riots which occurred during the second part of the inter-war period, particularly in the middle and late 1930's, had the effect of modifying the opposition of the employer groups. Violence or work stoppages often took place without any formulation of demands or without the workers' support of the spokesman theoretically representing their views. At least some employers therefore began to see the advantage of dealing with responsible labor leaders and of forcing any subversive elements in the workers' associations out into the open.

Thus in Malaya, in 1939, legislation was introduced (but not enforced until 1941) authorizing and facilitating the functioning of unions. Employers in Indochina, who also had long opposed unionization, moved similarly in the latter part of the decade toward a recognition of the need for it. In the Netherlands Indies, membership in unions, after a setback in the early 1930's, slowly increased, although by far the largest unions were still composed of government officials and professional men. In Burma, as in Siam, unionization was impeded by the presence of a predominantly alien body of workers to whose welfare the nationals of both countries were either hostile or indifferent. Such organizations as existed survived only insofar as the governments in each country favored them as useful aids in preventing curtailment of production. Their development, however, was controlled lest they harbor elements striving to overthrow the established order.

The loss of their colonies by the Western powers and anti-colonial Japanese propaganda naturally induced a greater consciousness on their part of the existence of labor problems that must be coped with if the larger economic and social programs are to succeed. From the resolutions passed at the International Labour Organization's conference at Philadelphia in 1944,[1] it appears to have been generally recognized that the colonial governments could no longer rely on paternalistic measures or the voluntary cooperation of individual employers.

[1] Bruno Lasker, "A Labor Code for Dependent Peoples," *Far Eastern Survey*, XIII, 12, June 14, 1944, pp. 103-10.